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GERALD E. FRUG t
Although Professor Ellickson twice describes himself as a
"Prisoner of Liberal Thought" in his article Cities and Homeowners
Associations,' I doubt he really sees himself as an exponent of liberal
ideology. He does, after all, also identify himself as an "empiricist,"
as someone who relies on hard, observable facts and on inductive
reasoning that builds on those facts rather than on deductions from
generalized abstractions of the kind invented by armchair theorists.2
Yet I do not think that the facts on which he relies can be under-
stood apart from the ideological prism through which he sees them,
any more than the arguments he advances can be understood other
than as a modem articulation of a particular strand of liberal
political theory. Thus, although I intend to respond to the specific
suggestions he makes in his article, I think it essential for a full
understanding of his argument first to indicate its place within
liberal political thought.
Professor Ellickson wants to convince us that homeowners asso-
ciations are a better vehicle for decentralized power than are cities.
To do so, he must make a convincing distinction between the two
forms of associations, a convincing public/private distinction. This
he bases on the voluntary/involuntary distinction-homeowners
associations are formed voluntarily, while cities are formed at least
in part involuntarily.3 But to persuade us that homeowners asso-
ciations are formed voluntarily, he needs to have us think of them
as a miniature version of the liberal society envisioned by John
Locke. Thus, Professor Ellickson describes the homeowners asso-
ciation as an example of a Lockean social contract: a unanimous
agreement of property owners that creates a constitution for (at
least part of) the social order.4 It is this unanimous agreement
that makes the association voluntary. Like Locke before him, how-
ever, Professor Ellickson simply invents this "wholly voluntary"
f Professor of Law, Harvard University. A.B. 1960, University of California at
Berkeley; LL.B. 1963, Harvard University.
1 See E~lickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519,
1521, 1563 (1982).
2 Id. 1565.
3 See id. 1523.
4 Cf. J. LocxE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREAnsEs oF
Covmu*,uENT § 87, at 341-42 (P. Laslett 2d ed. 1967).
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contract as a postulate on which to base his argument. Although
he asserts that the original membership in homeowners associations
is wholly voluntary and that cities have involuntary members when
first formed, this assertion has no empirical support. Cities can
be, and have been, formed by the voluntary association of their
citizens, 5 while the original constitution of a homeowners association
might well be the work of a developer without the participation
of a single person who becomes a resident of the community.6 To
support his voluntary/involuntary distinction, Professor Ellickson
treats homeowners associations as if they come into existence by
the voluntary agreement of the original settlers and treats cities as
if they are created only after the residents are already in place.
Yet, this public/private distinction is hypothesis and nothing more.
Perhaps Professor Ellickson is suggesting not that we simply
accept this hypothesis, but that we make an inquiry in each case
to determine whether the association was in fact originally formed
by its residents, a developer, or some other group of people. But
that kind of inquiry would not distinguish cities from homeowners
associations: instead it would distinguish some of each from others
of each. It thus would not reproduce the current public/private
distinction at all. It also would be hard to do, because exactly
when cities were formed is a matter open to considerable debate.
We certainly need not accept the positivist definition of the forma-
tion of a city in terms of its being granted a corporate charter.
7
Moreover, the circumstances of the original formation rapidly lose
relevance as new residents move in, children take over their parents'
5 "More than anything else the fully developed ancient and medieval city was
formed and interpreted as a fraternal association." M. WEBER, THE CITY 96 (D.
Martindale & G. Neuwirth trans. 1958) (footnote omitted). A famous English
medieval example was the meeting of the whole town of Ipswich on June 29 and
July 2, 1200, in which officers were elected and "all the men of the town swore a
solemn oath to obey their officers, and to maintain the liberties and free customs
of their borough." C. PLATT, THE ENGLISH MEDIEVAL TowN 130 (1976). The
most famous American example was the Mayflower Compact signed prior to the
settling of Plymouth, Mass. See DOCUMENTS IN AMERicAN i ISTORY 15-16 (H.
Commager 7th ed. 1963); for a discussion of its significance, see H. ARENDT, ON
REVOLuTION 167-68 (1963).
6 Professor Ellickson himself recognizes this. In his discussion of the choice of
voting rights for a homeowners association, he presents the issue as a question of
the options available to the developer, not to the residents. See Ellickson, supra
note 1, at 1543-44.
7 Professor Ellickson dates the existence of cities from the award of their cor-
porate charters. See id. 1523. But many cities existed long before they were
awarded corporate charters. In colonial America, for example, most cities were
not corporations at all. Moreover, in England, London became a city by pre-
scription, not by the grant of a royal charter. See Frug, The City as a Legal
Concept, 93 HAv. L. REv. 1059, 1095-98 (1980).
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homes, and the like. It therefore seems unlikely that Professor
Ellickson would allow an historical proof that Plymouth, Mass., was
formed by a social contract" to determine the city's legal status
today.9 But without history, we are left simply with his liberal
postulate, one that we are free to reject. I do reject it. I can see
no difference at all-no legitimate public/private distinction at all-
between cities and homeowners associations.
Professor Ellickson relies on the public/private distinction for
more than simply his unsuccessful attempt to separate cities from
homeowners associations. He deduces certain legal rules from the
existence of the asserted distinction 0 and, more significantly, frames
his two most important arguments by relying on it. But in these
arguments he does not use the public/private distinction to divide
cities from homeowners associations; he uses it instead to classify
both forms of association as public for some purposes and as private
for others.
Thus in part II of his article, Professor Ellickson argues for a
stringent taking clause to protect residents of homeowners associa-
tions from their governing boards. Since a taking clause would
seem an unlikely suggestion for an association truly envisioned as
private (such as the family), recommendation of such a clause for
the homeowners association indicates that he envisions these groups
as having qualities generally associated with public organizations.
Like Locke, Professor Ellickson seems to recognize that the govern-
ing board of even a "purely voluntary" association is invested with
power that can threaten the association's members. Once a home-
owner is in place, any rule made by the governing board not
authorized by the original agreement threatens him with coercion.
To that extent, the homeowners association and the city are equally
dangerous to the liberty of their residents. As a result, Professor
Ellickson seeks to limit the power of the board of directors of his
8 See supra note 5.
9 It is by no means clear why even a voluntary contract formed by one group
of people should bind others. After all, property law limits covenants that run
with the land and equitable servitudes. Indeed the binding nature even for the
original parties is a puzzle for liberal theorists. See, e.g., R. DwoauN, TAKING
Ricus SmousLY 150-55 (1977).
10 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1527: "The feature of unanimous ratifica-
tion distinguishes [homeowners association agreements] from and gives them greater
legal robustness than non-unanimously adopted public constitutions .... In most
instances, familiar principles of contract law justify strict judicial enforcement of
the provisions of a private constitution." This attempt to deduce the appropriate
judicial reaction to a contract from the voluntariness of the contract is a classic
formalist mistake. See Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Hanv. L. REv. 553, 575-78
(1933).
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homeowners association, like Locke limited the power of the state,
by the articulation and defense of property rights of the members
against the governing board. In arguing for strict limits on the
board of directors' ability to alter the rules of the association once
it is under way, Professor Ellickson, unlike Locke, can rely on
modem property law concepts and on judicial review to protect
the property owner. And the extent of the protection of property
rights he suggests is impressive indeed-he proposes a truly astonish-
ing version of the "taking clause," preventing the governing board
from doing almost anything not authorized by the original charter
unless it pays compensation." Professor Ellickson apparently has
no trouble in applying public law to the governance of a home-
owners association with at least the severity he would apply it
to cities.
When, however, Professor Ellickson in part III turns to his
second principal argument-the one dealing with the democratic
franchise-he seems to recategorize both cities and homeowners
associations from public to private. How else can one understand
his rather startling modern defense of a property-based franchise,
one that departs from a two-hundred-year-old tradition within
liberalism seeking to accommodate political equality with property
rights, 1 2 except as a reduction of both cities and homeowners asso-
ciations to matters of essentially private concern? He does, after
all, retain a full democratic franchise for truly "public" govern-
ments, like the state and federal governments. 13 Moreover, he first
discusses the limit on the franchise in the context of private home-
owners associations. Here he seems to feel on comfortable ground:
after all, homeowners associations are purely private organizations,
and democracy is out of place in private as distinguished from
public affairs. Then he extends his defense of allocating the fran-
chise to the absentee property owner and not to his tenant-and
11 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1535-39.
12 Professor Ellickson's argument is based on his fear that political equalization
will lead to economic equalization. See id. 1554-56. But many liberal thinkers
since the late 18th century have argued against the inevitability of such a result.
For example, the idea that property and democracy were mutually reenforcing and
not mutually inconsistent was espoused in America by Tom Paine in 1776. See
E. FoErn, Tom PAL-E AND RmVOLUTIONARY AmERicA 94-96 (1976). In England,
James Mill was a central figure in the reconciliation of property with democracy;
he argued that the great majority of the people would be guided in their exercise
of the franchise by the advice and example of their betters. See J. Mmia, AN
EssAY ON GOVERNMENT (C. Shields ed. 1955). For a discussion of Mill's influence
on the issue, see E. HALEVY, THE GROWTH OF PHmosoPHIC RnICRALIScM (M. Morris
trans. 1966). For a demonstration that political equality has not in fact led to
economic equality, see G. Koixo, WELTH AND PowEu xN A mcA (1962).
13 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1558.
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presumably to the titleholder and not to his wife-to the case of
cities as well. Dressing up his argument for limiting the franchise
to owners of land in modem law-and-economics garb, he presents
people's choice of cities in which to live in private, market-like
terms: one should be free to choose whether to live in a city run
by nonresident landlords, by a single private corporation that owns
most of the land, or by residents, in the same way one is free to
choose whether to buy one toothpaste or another in the super-
market. It is this ability to privatize choices about city life that
seems to allow him to advance ideas of plutocracy from which
other liberal thinkers have shrunk for almost two centuries.
This oscillation between public and private imagery to describe
homeowners associations and cities is important because it reveals
that Professor Ellickson's arguments for a property-based franchise
cannot be properly understood as a defense of freedom of choice
for territorial associations concerning their form of organization.
Although he says that his argument is based on a preference for
decentralized decisionmaking,14 Professor Ellickson in fact suffers
from the typical liberal schizophrenia about the role of any form
of group power that is intermediate between a centralized state
and the individual. I contended in my City article that decentrali-
zation to intermediate groups is a dilemma within liberal thought.'5
Liberals, I claimed, seek both to buttress intermediate groups to
defend individuals against the state and to buttress the state to de-
fend individuals against intermediate groups. They have been
caught in the perilous contradiction: they want both to enhance
and restrict the power of intermediate groups, but they quite rightly
are frustrated in trying to do both at the same time. Professor
Ellickson criticizes this contention on the ground that it lacks
empirical support; his own article nicely provides the empirical
support he is asking for.
In part II of his article, which deals with the taking clause,
Professor Ellickson is concerned about the danger the power of the
homeowners association poses to the individual. Because he sees
the intermediate group as a threat to individual property rights,
he seeks to enhance the power of the state to limit that threat.
Thus he applauds strict judicial scrutiny of association actions sub-
sequent to its original charter and recommends an unusually
14See id. 1576-77. Yet even his position on voting rights is subject to some
state-imposed restrictions on the exercise of the association's freedom of choice.
See id. 1557-58.
15 See Frug, supra note 7, at 1121-24.
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stringent taking clause to protect the vested rights of the home
owner. The taking clause he espouses is far more restrictive of
group action than that current in federal constitutional juris-
prudence: rezoning of the association area-even destruction of a
view of Mt. Hood-requires compensation in Professor Ellickson's
view.16 Moreover, such a clause is so important that we cannot
allow the homeowner the freedom to choose not to have one. It
should be imposed by legislation, even by judicial activism, to pro-
tect the individual.' 7 Here, then, we have one version of the liberal
attitude toward intermediate groups. Here the state is seen as a
friend, protecting the individual from the threat of group tyranny.
In the next section of his article, however, Professor Ellickson
simply reverses his position on the comparative threat of the home-
owners association and the state. Here the issue is whether the
state should be so bold as to require one-person/one-vote elections
in cities or other forms of the franchise in homeowners associations.
Now the state appears as a threatening outsider, and the association
assumes the role of protective friend. How dare the state intervene
to prevent the group from deciding what form of franchise the
group wants, Professor Ellickson inquires. We want to protect
intermediate groups as a buttress of freedom-to-choose from the
imposition of state tyranny.
Now what explains Professor Ellickson's willingness to call on
the state to limit group power in part II and his opposition to call-
ing on the state to limit group power in part III? Sometimes he
seems to be for state restrictions on intermediate groups, and some-
times he seems to be against them. The reader might notice that
Professor Ellickson's appeal to the state for help occurs in the
section in which he defends property rights from the threat of
group power, and his resistance to state interference occurs in the
section when the democratic franchise is in issue. The reader
might therefore suspect that this property/democracy distinction is
simply an application of the particular branch of liberal ideology
Professor Ellickson is advancing. He is making a value choice for
property rights as against voting rights-indeed, he argues that vot-
ing rights should be based on property rights.' 8 Even his assertion
16 Compare Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1536, 1538 with, e.g., Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (not all actions that adversely
affect property rights constitute a taking).
17 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1536.
18 That Professor Ellickson believes a property-based franchise is a good idea
on the merits, and not just an option that people might accept, is made clear
throughout his argument concerning the franchise. See id. 1544, 1546-47, 1554-56.
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that residents should have a market-like freedom of choice to select
among possible allocations of voting power appears to be not a
preference for freedom but another example of preferring property
to democracy. It has long been an open secret that, in a society
with an uneven distribution of property, "freedom to choose" can
mean freedom to submit to the power of "private" property owners.
Whether the amount of coercion these property owners exercise
through state enforcement of contract and property rules is more
oppressive than that exercised directly by state action depends on
the definition of property and contract that the state enforces. 19
The property/democracy choice is not between freedom and
coercion but between different forms of social life both of which
allow the exercise of coercion. In this regard it is interesting
to note that Professor Ellickson alters the definition of property
rights within his article in a way that creates specific power re-
lations among property owners. In part II he very broadly de-
fines property rights because he wants to use a taking clause to
protect almost any value associated with property from adverse
collective decision-making. But in part III he recognizes only real
estate values as the ingredient of property that should entitle a
citizen to vote. It should be clear that if every item considered as
property protected from a taking in part II-such as a view of Mt.
Hood and the expectation of young couples to have children-were
treated as property in part III, everyone, including tenants, would
be property owners with an economic stake in the franchise. Thus,
the only way to limit the franchise to landowners in part III is to
alter the definition of property from a broad reading (the taking-
clause definition) to a narrow reading (the franchise definition).
This alteration in the definition of property has the same effect as
the change in characterizing cities and homeowners associations
from public to private and as the oscillation between seeking pro-
tection from intermediate associations and seeking protection from
the state. Each move masks a political choice designed to protect
property at the expense of democracy.
20
I oppose Professor Ellickson's attack on the democratic fran-
chise in both of its proposed forms. The stringent taking clause
192 M. WEzn, ECONOmy AND Socnm,=, 729-31 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds,
1978); Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Politicar" and "Economic"
Compulsion, 35 COLum. L. Rav. 149 (1935).
2OFor another author's discussion on the connection between rhetoric and
political choice, see M. J. Frug, Introduction: The Proposed Revision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: Solving the Crisis of. Professionalism or Legitimating
the Status Quo?, 26 V=L. L. Ray. 1121 (1981).
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he advocates would reallocate wealth by defining as property ex-
pectations not previously protected by law.2'1 Although Professor
Ellickson's definition of property is so open that a prediction as to
the effect of such a reallocation is impossible, the Supreme Court's
recent preference for protecting "investment-based" expectations
over other kinds of expectations demonstrates how such a clause
can be used to protect the rich-those with money to invest-in
preference to the poor.22  Moreover, a stringent taking clause pre-
vents collective decisionmaking by requiring compensation when-
ever a change in social organization is proposed. "Government
hardly could go on," Justice Holmes said, "if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law." 23 It seems that Professor
Ellickson's taking clause is designed precisely to prevent govern-
ment-that is, the collective choice of the residents of the home-
owners association-from going on. The taking clause thus by itself
attempts to limit the role of democracy.
My objections to Professor Ellickson's proposals to restrict the
franchise to property owners are the same as my objections to his
taking clause proposals. Indeed, the similarity of my objections
demonstrates the similarity of his two proposals. First, as my col-
league Frank Michelman has shown, a restriction on the franchise
is itself a transfer of wealth, a transfer likely to be from the poor
to the rich.24 Secondly, the restriction on the franchise will pre-
vent all non-property owners (as Professor Ellickson defines them)
from engaging in collective decisionmaking over their future.
Indeed, if one takes seriously Professor Ellickson's claim (in his
taking clause section) that a voting right, once allocated, is a prop-
erty right that cannot be diluted without compensation, the result
of his two proposals, taken together, would be not only to restrict
the franchise to property owners, but to deter the reestablishment
of a fully democratic franchise by requiring compensation before
the exclusive voting rights of property owners could be changed.
The last major point Professor Ellickson raises in his article
more directly confronts a specific contention I made in my City
21 The idea that legal protection creates wealth is a familiar one. See, e.g.,
J. BENTHAm, THE THEoRY OF LEisLAnio N 113 (C. Ogden ed. 1931) ("Property
and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made there was
no property; take away laws, and property ceases.").
22 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
23 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
24 See Michelman, Universal Resident Suffrage: A Liberal Defense, 130 U. PA.
L. REv. 1581, 1585 (1982).
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article. He suggests that, contrary to my contention, cities are in
fact not powerless. I am not at all sure why he considers this point
important; perhaps he is suggesting that cities already have too
much power rather than not enough. In any event, because he
quite elaborately criticizes what I think is a misreading of my
article, some response seems necessary. It is true that I claimed
that municipalities are generally restricted by law to nonprofit
activities, as indeed they are.2 Of course, there are some profit-
making city ventures, and Professor Ellickson mentions quite a few.
But I doubt that it is a controversial observation that profit-making
activity in the United States is overwhelmingly a private concern,
and that only a tiny portion of municipal business is profit-making.
Professor Ellickson seems to think that I contend that the reason
cities do not engage in profit-making activities is simply the existing
legal restrictions on them. But I make no such claim. The much
more powerful restraint on city profit-making business is the liberal
conviction that profit-making is a private rather than public activity;
the legal restrictions are simply examples of that ideological posi-
tion, as is the vote in Minot, North Dakota, to which he refers.
26
More importantly, Professor Ellickson seems to contend that,
although not generally engaged in business for profit, cities are
nonetheless powerful because they can tax and regulate, have an
increasing number of employees, are sometimes immune from tort
and antitrust liability, are preferred in federal grant programs, and,
above all, have tax advantages under both the federal and local tax
laws. 27 Professor Ellickson rightly does not do more than mention
most of these advantages. After all, it was he who pointed out
that private homeowners associations can also tax and regulate.28
Moreover, the cities' power to do so-like their power to hire em-
ployees, escape tort or antitrust liability, and receive grants-in-aid-
is subject to restraint or abolition in accordance with the wishes of
state governments.- Current political events demonstrate that
25 As far as I can tell, neither Professor Ellickson nor the authorities he cites
in fact argue the contrary. See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1569-72; 2 E. McQum-
Ln, THE LAw OF Mumxcn.iAL CORPOPTONS 11 10.31 (3d ed. 1980); 56 Am. JuR. 2n
Municipal Corporations, Counties and Other Political Subdivisions § 210 (1971).
26 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 65, 1572-73. This point was made in my City
Article. See Frug, supra note 7, at 1066-67, 1077, 1152-54.
2
7 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1572, 1573-76.
28 See id. 1522-23.
29 Professor Ellickson makes much of home rule as a doctrine that can defend
cities against state power, id. 1569, but home rule has not in fact significantly limited
state power to control city decisionmaking. See Sandalow, The Limits of Mu-
nicipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643,
650-52 (1964). Even the most often-cited recent case aflirming municipal home-
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power subject to such a liability is fragile indeed. The same point,
of course, can be made for the city's tax advantages, the aspect of
city power Professor Ellickson most emphasizes. Moreover, many
of these tax advantages are not special indicia of city power at all:
the Ford Foundation and private voluntary hospitals have the same
tax exemptions as do cities. The distinction the Internal Revenue
Code makes is a profit/nonprofit distinction, not a public/private
distinction.30 It is also by no means clear that the city's ability to
issue tax-exempt bonds demonstrates the city's power over the pri-
vate industrial sector rather than the private sector's ability to use
city tax advantages to achieve its own purposes. But whether this
totality of advantage really produces city power can perhaps best be
understood by a hypothetical suggestion to IBM that it trade its
legal status for that of a municipal corporation. It can gain tax
advantages, and perhaps some tort immunities and grants-in-aid as
well. Of course, in return it would become subject to the power
of the state to control all its decisions comparable to the way the
state controls the decisions of its Department of Transportation,
not to mention becoming subject to civil service laws, restrictions
on its ability to raise revenue and to borrow, and democratic con-
trol of its officials. Would Professor Ellickson suggest that a
rational maximizer of power would consider IBM in a more power-
ful legal position if it traded?
One final point about the influence of liberal ideology in
Professor Ellickson's arguments needs to be made. Many of his
arguments are apparent deductions from assumptions about human
nature that seem to be at least a caricature of the liberal assump-
tions about human nature. 31 Professor Ellickson's people are stereo-
types derived from modern-day welfare economics. They exhaus-
tively calculate all costs imposed on them and care not a whit about
helping others in need. Since the choices in life seem to be divided
rule immunity from state control, State ex rel. Heinig v. City of Milwaukie, 231
Or. 473, 373 P.2d 680 (1962), has been significantly narrowed by a recent decision,
City of La Grande v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204,
aff'd on rehearing, 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d 765 (1978). See generally Anderson,
Resolving State/Local Governmental Conflict-A Tale of Three Cities, 18 Urn. L.
ANN. 129 (1980).
3 0 See I.R.C. § 501 (1976).
31 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1535:
Although an entrant into an association would be chary of a rule re-
quiring unanimous member approval of wealth-creating amendments, he
would also fear being regularly on the losing end of the amendment
process. A taking clause in the original constitution that entitled losers
from amendments to compensation would appear to be an attractive way
to resolve the entrants dilemma.
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into only two categories-redistribution of wealth and maximization
of wealth-they by nature oppose the first and seek the second. No
one in Professor Ellickson's world would even suggest that their
association be called "Solidarity." Moreover, Professor Ellickson
relentlessly reduces human activity to that of being a consumer.
His people shop for homeowners associations and shop for cities in
which to live; as consumers, they now refuse to buy one-person/one-
vote in homeowners associations,32 and, if his ideas are adopted,
they will select from brochures offering different voting rights in
cities. Even my modest suggestion of city banks and insurance
companies is viewed from the consumer's point of view; it is criti-
cized because the more banks people can patronize the better.
33
What is missing here, of course, is seeing human activity in its
creative, productive form-not the shopping for banks but their
management, not the selection among cities or homeowners asso-
ciations but their operation. It is from this point of view that I
called for participatory democracy for all groups intermediate be-
tween the individual and the state. The value to be advanced was
not "freedom to choose" but " 'public freedom'-the ability to par-
ticipate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect one's
life." 34
I think that Professor Ellickson is mistaken in thinking that
one can deduce any form of social life from his assumptions about
human nature. But it might be useful at least to mention a non-
liberal version of the formation of territorial associations to demon-
strate how powerfully Professor Ellickson's particular assumptions
influence his analysis. For example, compare Cities and Home-
owners Associations with the description of the creation of terri-
torial associations in Aristotle's Politics. In that work, Aristotle
sought to explain why men formed together in a polis, a term that
32 Although Professor Ellickson asserts consumers make this choice, see id.
1543-44, he also says that voting rights are set by state statute. See id. 1543. But
if the statutes exist, why aren't they, and not consumer choice, the explanations for
the absence of democracy in homeowners associations? To this Professor Ellickson
responds: "If the condominium statutes were preventing developers from maximiz-
ing profits, one might expect developers to seek passage of statutory amendments
authorizing voting by residency in private associations. I am aware of no evi-
dence that either developers or entrants into new private communities are unhappy
with the prevailing system of voting by economic stake. This is a clue that one-
resident/one-vote does not have much consumer appeal as a private voting system."
Id. 1543-44 (emphasis in original). This response takes behaviorist political science
about as far as it can possibly go. See generally S. LuKEs, PoWEn: A RADICAL
Vmw (1974).
3 3 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1567.
34 Frug, supra note 7, at 1068 (footnote omitted).
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is normally translated as "city" but that could also be translated as
"homeowners association" because its membership was limited to
landowners.35  The reason for the creation of the polis, Aristotle
argued, was not wealth maximization or protection from redistri-
bution of wealth, but friendship. 3 Since the drive for human
friendship was natural, men by nature lived in a polis.37 If one
were to substitute the term friendship every time Professor Ellick-
son appeals to wealth maximization as the goal of cities or home-
owners associations, I think that his arguments for a taking clause
to prevent the redistribution of wealth or for the allocation of the
franchise by the dollar value of the property owned would appear
bizarre. The development of the bonds of friendship, like the
development of "the capacity for communal self-governance across
the entire existential space of life," 38 would not seem likely to be
advanced by allocating power and protection within the friendship
on the basis of wealth. Of course, the exact form that a social
organization based on friendship would take is uncertain and cer-
tainly cannot be determined by deduction. But new possibilities
for the structuring of social life will occur to us if we allow our-
selves to go beyond the limited possibilities of human relationship
allowed by the seller/customer relationship to which Professor
Ellickson so often refers.
You may have noticed that I have suddenly switched into
utopian thinking; but Professor Ellickson's reliance on the concept
of a "free market" is no less utopian.3 9 The critical difference
between us is not the difference between being utopian and being
practical: the difference is between our utopias. I think decisions
about the future will be legitimate only if based on values generated
by small-scale groups organized as participatory democracies. This
3 5 On the limit to the membership of the polis, see M. Fmn'LEY, Tim ANCIENT
ECONOMY 95-97 (1973). In Athens, however, property owner-citizens had equal
voting rights regardless of wealth; they would have considered Professor Ellickson's
proposal to allocate the franchise in accordance with the value of the land owned
as an argument for substituting aristocracy in place of democracy. See AISTOTLE-,
PorTics 207-11 (H. Rackham trans. 1959).
3o A pols "does not exist for the sake of trade and of business relations ....
[it] is a partnership of families and of clans in living well . . . . [Its] organiza-
tion is produced by the feeling of friendship, for friendship is the motive of social
life .. " ARsTo=TE, supra note 35, at 213-19.
37 Id. 9.
38 Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1358, 1419 (1982).
39 For an analysis of the market as a utopian vision, see generally K. PoLANyi,
THE GREAT T A~sFOamiON (1944).
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is what I mean by rethinking and restructuring American society.40
Whether we call these groups cities, homeowners associations, cor-
porations, or soviets does not much matter to me. Professor Ellick-
son considers property rights and wealth maximization as the road
to a just society, but I favor the enriching process of ge.nuine
democratic participation, a process designed to change our ideas
about how society can be organized and how people ought to treat
each other.
40 See Frug, supra note 7, at 1154.
